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CLINTON V. OSTER, JR. AND C. KURT ZORN*
T HE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT of 1978 (Dereg-
ulation Act) and the actions of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) have led to the deregulation of a once highly
regulated industry.' The goal of airline deregulation is to
substitute competition among the airlines in place of govern-
ment regulation as a means of achieving low fares and effi-
cient service.' By liberalizing entry and exit restrictions,3 the
Deregulation Act has made it easier for existing carriers to
withdraw from markets they no longer wish to serve, and for
both newly formed and existing carriers to enter new mar-
kets. Many feared that small communities would experience
widespread service losses as major carriers adjusted to new
freedoms and heightened competition by redeploying their
jet aircraft to larger, denser and potentially more profitable
markets.4 To counter these possible losses, the Deregulation
Act guarantees "essential air transportation" to small com-
munities for ten years following passage of the Act, and sup-
ports the guarantee with a subsidy program aimed
* Professors Oster and Zorn are on the faculty of the School of Public and Environ-
mental Affairs, Indiana University.
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978), reprinted
it A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 545 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (amending the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq (Supp.
IV 1980)).
Deregulation Act § 3, (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980)).
:, Id. § § 10, 12, 19 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 401(d) (5), (d)(7), (j)(2)).
4 J. Meyer, C. Oster, I. Morgan, B. Berman & D. Strassman, AIRLINE DEREGULA-
TION, THE EARLY EXPERIENCE (1981) [hereinafter cited as THE EARLY EXPERIENCE].
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specifically at commuter airlines.5
Deregulation relies heavily on commuter airlines to fill any
voids left by the larger carriers after they terminate service to
small communities.6 Commuters' smaller, propeller-driven
aircraft are better suited to the short haul, low density routes
typical of service to small communities. Commuter airlines,
however, are commonly perceived as being far less safe than
the jet carriers they are replacing.7 In recognition of this con-
cern, the Deregulation Act clearly states that safety must
have the "highest priority in air commerce, including specifi-
cally the prevention of any deterioration in the established
level of safety." 8 The Deregulation Act further directs the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to establish new
standards of safety for commuters equal to those of certifi-
cated carriers, unless the FAA finds that the 1978 revision of
commuter safety standards has achieved that result.9
A recent comment discussed the effect of Section 33 of the
Deregulation Act on air service to small communities."° The
commentator concluded that some form of continued regula-
tion will be needed, because small community service has
been adversely affected both qualitatively and quantitatively
by deregulation." While other systematic analyses of small
community service under deregulation have found a more
favorable quantitative impact on such service,' 2 scant analy-
sis has been conducted on the quality of commuter service.
There is little disagreement that commuters fly smaller, usu-
ally less comfortable aircraft offering few inflight amenities.
Safety, however, is an important element of quality about
which there is not widespread agreement. 13
r, Deregulation Act § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419(a) (Supp. IV 1980)).
6 THE EARLY EXPERIENCE, supra note 4, at 156-57.
, Id at 152-55.
Deregulation Act § 3 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
Id § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419 (Supp. IV 1980)).
, Comment, Section 419 of the AirMe Deregulation Act." What Has Been the Effect On Air
Service to Small Communities?, 47 J. AIR L. & COM. 151 (1981).
" Id. at 170.
,2 Oster, The Impact of Deregulation On Service to Small Communities, 9 J. CONTEMPO-
RARY Bus. 103 (1980).
" For one viewpoint see Reingold, Travelers' Advisoq: The Commuters Are Coming, 11
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This article will analyze commuter airline safety and its
implications for the growing role of commuters under deregu-
lation. Through a comparison of the safety record of differ-
ent segments of the commuter industry with that of jet
carriers, the article will examine whether the increased role of
commuter airlines is inherently inconsistent with the goal of
maintaining the outstanding safety record of the domestic
airline industry. As part of this assessment, the safety per-
formance of the commuter industry between 1970 and 1980
will be examined with a focus on systematic differences
among major subsets of the industry. The limited evidence
regarding the impact of the 1978 revisions14 to commuter
safety regulations will also be examined.
The analysis begins with a brief examination of the effect
of deregulation on commuter growth and development. Next
the safety performance of the commuter industry will be ex-
amined in detail. In conclusion, the analyses of growth and
safety are brought together to assess the long range impact of
deregulation on airline safety.
I. THE EFFECT OF DEREGULATION ON COMMUTER
AIRLINES
Prior to deregulation commuter airlines had never been
subject to CAB economic regulation so long as they operated
aircraft below a specified size.15 Before 1972, commuter air-
lines were limited by CAB regulations to use of aircraft with
a maximum gross takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds. 16 That
limit, coupled with safety regulations requiring a flight at-
tendant for aircraft with 20 or more passenger seats, 7 effec-
tively constrained commuters to 19-passenger aircraft. In
WASHINGTON MONTHLY 56-7 (1979) and Kaus, The Dark Side of Deregulation, 11
WASHINGTON MONTHLY 33-40 (1979), and for an opposing viewpoint see Oster and
Zorn, Airline Deregulation, Commuter Safety, and Regional Air Transportation 3-11 GROWTH
AND CHANGE 14 (1983).
1 14 C.F.R. § 135 (1980).
Ir, There were, however, some minimal data reporting requirements. 14 C.F.R. § 298
(1980).
6 14 Fed. Reg. 1427 (1949).
, 14 C.F.R. § 135.107 (1964).
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1972, the CAB regulations were altered to allow commuter
airlines to operate aircraft with up to 30 seats.18 The Deregu-
lation Act raised the passenger limit of commuter aircraft to
55 seats.1 9 Furthermore, under deregulation the CAB has
subsequently raised this limit to 60 seats.20
By permitting larger commuter aircraft, the Deregulation
Act has increased the range of markets in which these smaller
airlines can compete. The use of larger aircraft has enabled
commuters to serve higher density markets more effectively,2
especially those markets containing airports such as Washing-
ton National, LaGuardia and O'Hare, which are subject to
capacity controls. These capacity controls have limited the
number of flights by commuters to and from these airports.
Larger aircraft enable commuter airlines to serve more pas-
sengers with the same limited number of flights.
The use of larger aircraft has probably increased passenger
acceptance of commuter flights, because of the increased
comfort and higher level of amenities made possible by
greater size. Business travelers, a group that historically has
constituted between 80 and 90 percent 22 of commuter passen-
gers in most markets, will likely find these larger aircraft
more comfortable and therefore more acceptable. More im-
portantly, the larger aircraft should also make commuter air
travel more acceptable to nonbusiness travelers, a segment of
the market which commuter airlines have previously had
trouble attracting. 2
3
The impact of the change in commuter aircraft size limits
has not yet been fully appreciated. The design and certifica-
R1 37 Fed. Reg. 19609 (1972).
'9 Deregulation Act § 32 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 416(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980)).
- 14 C.F.R. § 298.2(i) (1983). The Deregulation Act also empowers the CAB to
increase capacity limits when the public interest so requires. Deregulation Act § 22
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 416(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980)).
21 AIRLINE DEREGULATION: REBIRTH OF THE ENTREPRENEURS ch. 8 (. Meyer &
C. Oster eds. 1984).
22 This figure was cited in conversations the authors had with the management of
more than ten commuter airlines.
23 The management of Air Wisconsin indicated to the authors that nonbusiness
travel increased markedly with the introduction of 50-seat aircraft into markets previ-
ously served with 19-seat aircraft.
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tion process for new aircraft takes several years, and manu-
facturers are only now developing aircraft to take advantage
of the revised regulations.24 Commuter airlines are already
using larger aircraft to serve dense markets more effectively,
but these aircraft were developed prior to the rule change
and do not incorporate the latest and most efficient flight
technology.25
One of the most important features of the Deregulation
Act for commuter airlines is the easing of entry and exit re-
26 athv eestrictions for established jet carriers. Jet aircraft have never
been well suited for service in short haul, low density markets;
the fuel price increases of 1973-74 and 1979 made them in-
creasingly uneconomical.27 With more flexibility to select
their markets under deregulation, jet carriers began dropping
these unprofitable routes.28 Commuter airlines, with their
smaller and more fuel efficient aircraft, have often found
these markets profitable and have begun service as replace-
ment carriers for the withdrawing jet airlines.29 As much as
20 to 25 percent of the post deregulation commuter growth
may be due to these replacement opportunities. °
The revitalization and expansion of the FAA's Aircraft
Loan Guarantee Program (Loan Program) 31 under deregula-
tion has benefited many commuter airlines. In an effort to
quell fears that service to small communities would suffer as
jet carriers terminated service under the eased exit require-
ments, the Loan Program was extended to include commuter
carriers, whereas it had previously been limited to certificated
carriers.3 2 The Loan Program insures loans on up to 90 per-
cent of the principal and 100 percent of the interest incurred
24 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF ADVANCED AIR TRANSPORT
TECHNOLOGY, pt. 3, 38-41 (1982) (Congressional Board of the 97th Congress).
2., Id.
21i Deregulation Act § 3 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4)(Supp. IV 1980)).
2, THE EARLY EXPERIENCE, supra note 4, at 188-98.
8 Id. at 128-38.
2 Id. at 139-52.
:,o AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 21, ch. 8.
.13 Deregulation Act § 42 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (Supp. IV 1980)).
32 For a description of the Aircraft Loan Guarantee Program see AIRLINE DEREGU-
LATION , supra note 21, ch. 6.
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by eligible commuters acquiring aircraft. By insuring the
lender against default, the Loan Program reduces the risk of
loans to commuter airlines, thereby enabling carriers to
finance aircraft acquisitions at lower rates and for longer
terms than would have otherwise been possible. From 1978,
when the Deregulation Act was passed, to January 15, 1982,
over $100 million in loans were guaranteed for commuters
under the Loan Program for the purchase of 61 aircraft.3 4 Of
the commuter aircraft purchased under the Loan Program,
slightly more than 21 percent were aircraft seating over 30
passengers.3 5 Thus, the Loan Program has helped commuter
airlines to expand and begin the transition to larger aircraft.
A provision guaranteeing "essential air transportation" for
ten years to small communites was included in the Deregula-
tion Act in response to concerns that small communities
might lose air service under deregulation. To ensure contin-
ued service, an operating subsidy for commuter airlines was
authorized under section 33 of the Deregulation Act with
compensation based on community needs and the use of air-
craft of appropriate size.36
Subsidies for small community air service have a long his-
tory dating back to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (Aero-
nautics Act) 3 7 Section 406 of the Aeronautics Act authorized
the CAB.,to subsidize the transportation of mail.3 8 Compen-
sation paid ostensibly for the support of mail carriage actu-
ally became a means of promoting and subsidizing passenger
service to small communites 9 While the payments initially
went to the trunk airlines, by the early 1950's the local service
airlines were receiving most of the payments. 40  By 1978,
when the Deregulation Act was passed, annual payments to
1 Deregulation Act § 42 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (Supp. IV 1980)).
3, AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 21, at Tables 6-6 and 6-8.
Id at Table 6-7.
Deregulation Act § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419(d) (Supp. IV 1980)).
:17 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 1705 (1938).
- Id § 406.
- See, e.g., West Coast Case, 6 C.A.B. 979-93 (1946).
- THE EARLY EXPERIENCE, supra note 4, at 27-31.
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local service airlines were well in excess of $75 million.41 Sec-
tion 33 of the Deregulation Act was designed to replace the
previous subsidy program and serve as the primary form of
assistance to carriers operating in small communities.42
Section 33 of the Deregulation Act guarantees that essen-
tial air transportation will be maintained for ten years to
those communites listed on air carrier certificates as of Octo-
ber 24, 1978, the date the Act was passed.43 The objective of
the section 33 program is to ensure that small communities
retain easy access to the nation's air transportation system via
air service to one or more large airports, where opportunities
to connect to other flights are available.4 The CAB has been
given the responsibility of determining what level of service is
"essential" for each small community. Communities eligible
for the section 33 program include both those that were re-
ceiving air service from certificated carriers when the Deregu-
lation Act was passed, as well as others whose service had
been suspended with the permission of the CAB, yet not for-
mally terminated.45 In addition, communities that had been
deleted from carriers' certificates after July 1, 1968, were to
be reviewed by the CAB for possible inclusion in the
46program.
The subsidy program authorized by section 33 of the De-
regulation Act guarantees service to a greater number of
communities than had been eligible for subsidy under the
section 406 program of the Aeronautics Act. Critics of dereg-
ulation have charged that this broader coverage will cause
the subsidy cost to the government to be much higher than
under the old program.47 On the other hand, supporters of
the new program have argued that the total subsidy cost will
,, Id at 139.
.2 Deregulation Act § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419 (Supp. IV 1980)).
43 Id § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419(a), (b), (g) (Supp. IV 1980)).
44 Id § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419() (Supp. IV 1980)).
45 Id § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419(a) (Supp. IV 1980)).
46 Id. § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419(b) (Supp. IV 1980)).
47 See U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Aviation, Science,
and Transportation, Hearings on Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 21-24 (March, 1977).
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be reduced. Section 33 of the Deregulation Act, unlike sec-
tion 406 of the Aeronautics Act, has designated commuter
carriers, with planes that are far more economical for low-
density, short-haul service than the jet aircraft of the trunk
airlines,4 as eligible to provide essential air service. 49
Two factors support the argument that the new subsidy
program actually results in lower subsidy costs. First, the typ-
ical commuter airline is able to provide frequent service in
short-haul, low-density markets at a far lower cost than that
of a carrier using jets.50 With commuter airlines, fewer cities
will require subsidy to ensure adequate air service, and those
cities which require subsidy will need far less than under the
old section 406 program.5" The second factor pointing to
lower subsidy costs is that, unlike the old section 406 pro-
gram, the Deregulation subsidy is tied to the needs of the
community receiving the service rather than to the carrier
providing the service.52 A competitive bidding process for the
subsidy awards was intended to lead to the selection of the
lowest-cost carrier.53
The Deregulation Act includes other provisions to ensure
that termination of service by large airlines has a minimal
effect on small community air service. Certificated carriers
and carriers receiving compensation are required under the
Deregulation Act to give a 90-day notice to the CAB before
being all6wed to terminate service in any market. 5 Noncer-
tificated carriers must give a 30-day notice. 55 The 30-day no-
tice requirement represents an increase in regulation for
many commuter carriers, which were able to withdraw from
markets at will before deregulation. If terminations cause a
community's air service to fall below the level of essential air
transportation, the CAB will first attempt to arrange for a
4R AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 21, ch. 4.
49 Deregulation Act § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419(c) (Supp. IV 1980)).
-' AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 21, ch.4.
Id at ch. 10.
Deregulation Act § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419(d), (0 (Supp. IV 1980)).
AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 21, ch. 4.
'" Deregulation Act § 33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 419(a) (Supp. IV 1980)).
I d.
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new carrier to enter the market to provide replacement serv-
ice.56 If, however, the CAB is unable to find a replacement
carrier, it is empowered to hold the incumbent in the market
until a replacement carrier is found." If the incumbent sub-
sequently suffers financial losses from being restrained, the
CAB is required to compensate the carrier for those losses.5 8
Thus, while the section 33 subsidy program of the Deregula-
tion Act was designed for commuter carriers, local service
carriers and trunk airlines have received payments for losses
while being forced to provide air service, until replacement
carriers are found.
II. COMMUTER AIRLINE SAFETY
While economic regulation of commuter airlines has histor-
ically been minimal, safety regulation has been much more
substantial. Commuter carriers are governed by FAA safety
regulations,59 which are generally referred to as "Part 135".
Part 135 contains the requirements for commuter carriers'
basic organizational structures, administrative procedures,
crew qualifications, and aircraft and equipment standards.
Part 135 was adopted in 1964 in response to growth of the
commuter industry.6" The regulations were amended several
times as the industry continued to grow, and most changes
after 1964 pertain to aircraft and equipment operating proce-
dures. For example, in 1967, an amendment was adopted
prescribing requirements that would allow Instrument Land-
ing Systems (ILS) procedures at certain airports.6 One of
the most important changes during this period disallowed the
use of single-engine aircraft in commuter operations after
1972.62 The amendments also introduced additional airwor-




14 C.F.R. § 135 (1964).
Commuter Airline Safety 1970-1979, 4 (National Transportation Safety Board
1980).
',l 32 Fed. Reg. 6901, Amendment 135-5 (Effective May 5, 1967).
62 14 C.F.R. § 135.18 (1978).
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10 or more passenger seats.63
The commuter industry grew and gained visibility through
the 1960's and early 1970's, partly because commuters were
moving into markets previously served by larger carriers.64
During the late 1970's commuters began limited replacement
service to communities terminated by local service and trunk
airlines.65 The first substitution occurred in 1967, when
Apache Airlines replaced American Airlines at Douglas, Ari-
zona.66 American Airlines had originally used Douglas as a
refueling stop for long flights. 67 As aircraft technology im-
proved, such stops were no longer needed.
The evolution of the Allegheny Commuter System has fur-
ther contributed to bringing commuter airlines to the atten-
tion of the public. The system was developed by Allegheny
Airlines to provide commuter replacement service for com-
munities Allegheny no longer wished to serve.68 Beginning
on November 15, 1967, Allegheny contracted with commuter
operators to provide feeder service from small communities to
larger cities served by Allegheny jets.69 For commuter air-
lines that contracted with Allegheny Airlines, the arrange-
ments were attractive because they provided opportunities
for commuters to expand into new markets. In addition, the
commuters gained some "legitimacy" from being identified
with an established local service airline, and also gained sub-
stantial help from Allegheny in the form of assistance in mar-
keting, ticketing, reservations, and other services. In return,
Allegheny was able to terminate unprofitable service in low-
density, short-haul markets while retaining the business of
passengers wishing to connect to Allegheny's longer flights.
Furthermore, as part of the contractual arrangement, Alle-
, 14 C.F.R. § 135.169 (1983).
AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 21, ch. 2.
THE EARLY EXPERIENCE, supra note 4, at 148-52.
Commuter Airlines and Federal Regulation: 1926-1979, 6 (Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration 1980).
67 id.
- Following deregulation Allegheny Airlines changed its name to USAir.
,- Commuter Airline Safety 126 and 211 (C. Oster and K. Zorn, Report to U.S.
Department of Transportation, University Research Division, 1982).
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gheny was able to impose strict operational and maintenance
standards on the commuters in excess of those required by the
CAB and FAA, thus retaining some control over the quality
of service provided under the Allegheny Commuter logo.
As commuter airlines assumed a more important role in
the nation's air transportation system, public attention began
to focus on commuter safety relative to the jet carriers they
were replacing. A common perception has been that com-
muter airlines, with their smaller aircraft, are not as safe as
the trunk and local service airlines, and some travelers are
therefore reluctant to fly the commuters.7 ° As will be seen
below, the perception is not fully justified.
A. Measures of Safety
The safety of airline travel is frequently assessed using sta-
tistics based on accidents or fatalities per passenger-mile or
aircraft-mile. A widely cited statistic, passenger fatalities per
100 million passenger-miles, suggests that commuters are be-
tween 10 and 30 times less safe than established jet carriers.7"
Even on this basis, however, commuters have a safety record
which is no worse than that of the private automobile.7"
Upon reflection, it is not surprising that commuter airlines
appear much less safe than jet carriers when a distance-based
measure is used for comparison. Substantial differences be-
tween the average flight length of commuter carriers and jet
carriers make such measures inherently biased against com-
muters. In airline travel the greatest risk of accident is during
takeoff and landing. A typical jet, a B-727-200, for example,
flying the average jet flight length of 730 miles with a full
load of passengers will amass almost 106,000 passenger-miles
but will takeoff and land only once. For a typical 19-passen-
ger commuter aircraft to accumulate a similar number of
passenger-miles, flying full on the average commuter flight of
70 See Kaus, supra note 13, at 33-40.
7 Transportation Facts and Trends 17 (Transportation Association of America
1980).
72 Id.
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120 miles, it would have to make over 46 flights, thus taking
off and landing 46 times.
A statistical measure based on departures rather than dis-
tance more accurately reflects the risk facing a passenger on a
commuter flight. While several departure-based measures
can be constructed, passenger fatalities per million passenger-
departures is a realistic measure to gauge the risk of taking a
commuter flight. It is free from strong biases either for or
against commuters, and without strong biases for or against
different types of commuter operations. While data on pas-
senger departures are not available, data on enplanements, a
close substitute, are readily obtainable. A passenger is
counted as an enplanement each time he or she boards a
flight. On nonstop flights, passenger departures and enplane-
ments are the same. On multistop flights, however, a passen-
ger is counted as a single enplanement yet represents an
additional passenger departure for every intermediate stop.
7 3
B. Analysis of Commuter Safety
A comparison of passenger fatalities per million enplane-
ments for commuters and established jet carriers during the
years 1970 through 1980 reveals that, in the aggregate, com-
muters are about three times less safe than jet carriers. Dur-
ing this period commuters had 3.26 passenger fatalities per
million enplanements while certificated jet carriers had only
0.91. 7' The difference, while substantially less than that
shown by distance-based measures, is still significant. Thus,
while the concern with commuter safety has been overstated,
it is legitimate to question whether deregulation's increased
reliance on commuters may ultimately degrade the overall
safety level of the nation's air transportation system.
Such a question, however, cannot be addressed solely with
the use of aggregate, industry-wide safety figures. The com-
'13 Little information is available to assess the magnitude of the difference between
passenger departures and enplanements in various segments of the air transportation
industry, but there is no reason to believe that serious systematic biases are introduced
by this measure in the analysis that follows.
7* AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 21, at table 5-3.
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muter airline industry is in no sense homogeneous - opera-
tors vary in terms of size, experience, managerial expertise,
route networks, aircraft fleets, and financial condition. Con-
cluding that commuters are on the average somewhat less
safe than jet carriers masks the divergence in safety perform-
ance within the commuter industry itself. To understand
commuter safety and the implications of commuter growth
on overall air transportation safety, it is necessary to examine
the safety performance of different segments of the commuter
industry. Data limitations, however, severely restrict the
analyses to an examination of only a few of the factors most
often thought to influence commuter safety.
75
The size of individual commuter operations varies widely
within the industry. In 1980, the largest commuter carrier
was well over 1,000 times larger than the smallest in terms of
enplanements.76 Segmenting the commuter industry based
on airline size reveals that, from 1970 to 1980, the 20 largest
commuters, who carried over half of all commuter passen-
gers, were six times safer on the average than the rest of the
industry." Even more significant is the fact that the top 20
commuter airlines have a safety record virtually identical to
the excellent safety record of the jet airlines. 78 Thus, increas-
ing the role of commuters need not worsen the overall safety
record of the airline industry if the growth occurs in segments
of the commuter industry that operate with safety compara-
ble to that of the jet airlines.
7, For example, since most commuters are privately owned companies, the data nec-
essary to assess the relationship between the financial health of commuter airlines and
safety is unavailable. Similarly, data is not available to describe the training and expe-
rience of pilots at each commuter airline. Therefore, the role of these factors on safety
will not be examined.
7r Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics (Civil Aeronautics Board 1980).
77 The average rates for the 20 largest commuters and the rest of the industry are
1.15 and 6.97 passenger fatalities per million enplanements respectively. These rates
and those that follow were calculated using operations data from the CAB Form 298
and accident data from the National Transportation Safety Board. More detail on
methodology and results can be found in C. Oster and K. Zorn, supra note 69, at 209-
17.
78 The average rates for the 20 largest commuters and the jet airlines are 1.15 and
0.91 passenger fatalities per million enplanements respectively. Oster and Zorn, supra
note 13, at 8.
327
328 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
One hypothesis about the impact of carrier size on com-
muter airline safety is that a larger airline can afford greater
specialization in maintenance, training, and operations. By
allowing each individual in the organization to concentrate
on a narrower range of responsibilities, larger commuters
may achieve more efficient performance. There may also be
other areas where greater size makes some functions easier.
For example, maintaining an aircraft requires access to a sub-
stantial inventory of spare parts. A large carrier with a size-
able fleet of aircraft may be better able to maintain such an
inventory at its base of operations rather than contract out its
maintenance to others.
A wide variety of aircraft are used by commuter airlines.
The flight equipment ranges from six-seat, piston-engine
craft, originally designed for corporate or general aviation
use, to 60-seat turboprops designed as commercial transport
aircraft. From 1974 to 1980, commuter operators using tur-
bine-engine aircraft provided safer air service on the average
than those commuters using only piston-engine aircraft or
mixed fleets of both turbine and piston-engine aircraft.79
Although the propeller engines on all commuter aircraft
might appear much the same to a passenger's uncritical
glance, a closer look would reveal important differences be-
tween the turbine engines usually found on aircraft seating 15
or more passengers, and the piston engines commonly found
on smaller aircraft. Turbine engines operate using the same
basic mechanism as modern fan-jet engines found on large jet
aircraft. Turbine engines have far fewer moving parts than
piston engines and have proven themselves to be more relia-
ble and easier to maintain. Thus, it is not surprising that
commuter airlines which operate only turbine-engine aircraft
have amassed a better safety record than those carriers oper-
ating other types of fleets.
79 Carriers using only turbine engine aircraft had an average rate of 1.06 passenger
fatalities per million enplanements; carriers using only piston engine aircraft had an
average rate of 2.23 passenger fatalities per million enplanements; and carriers operat-
ing mixed fleets of both piston and turbine-engine aircraft had an average rate of 2.21
passenter fatalities per million enplanements. C. Oster and K. Zorn, supra note 69, at
134.
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There is reason to believe that the effects of carrier size and
aircraft type do not operate independently of one another.
Table 18o presents results from an analysis of the interaction
of carrier size and aircraft (engine) type. Among carriers us-
ing piston engines exclusively, the twenty largest had a better
safety record than the remaining carriers.8 In addition, the
twenty largest piston carriers had about the same safety rec-
ord as the ten biggest turbine carriers, which suggests that
among the larger carriers both piston and turbine aircraft
can be operated with the same degree of safety.82 The results
in Table 1 also reveal that among the smaller carriers, those
operating turbine fleets have a much better safety record
than those operating either piston or mixed fleets.8"
Commuter airlines fly into the largest and best-equipped
airports in the country, and also into smaller airports which
are equipped with less sophisticated landing and navigational
aids. In fact, it is often said that much of the difference in
safety performance between commuter airlines and larger jet
carriers stems not from the commuters themselves, but rather
from the nature of the airports they serve.84 An analysis of
commuter aircraft accidents that occurred during the landing
phase reveals that passenger fatality rates are higher for
flights into airports not equipped with glide slopes85 than for
o Table I
INTERACTION OF CARRIER SIZE AND FLEET TYPE
Passenger Fatalities per Million Enplanements
Fleet Type Carrier Size
Largest 10 or 20 Remainder
Piston Only (Largest 20) 1.66 3.73
Turbine Only (Largest 10) 1.60 0.11
Mixed Piston and Turbine (Largest 10) 0.59 6.34
Source: Civil Aeronautics Board, Form 298, Schedule T- I and National Transpor-




U.S. Congress, House Senate Committee on Aviation, Reauthorization of the Airport
andAirway Development Program, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, p. 595.
8. The glide slope is a navigational aid that assists a pilot in maintaining the correct
path of descent during landings. Such a guidance system is particularly useful during
landings made in bad weather or conditions of poor visibility.
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flights into airports with such equipment. Before concluding
that glide slopes are crucial to safe operations, however, the
complicating factor that airports without glide slopes are
more frequently served by smaller commuter carriers must be
recognized.
The significance of size as a determinant of commuter
safety is further strengthened when the interaction of carrier
size and landing aids is analyzed. Table 286 indicates that the
presence of glide slopes at airports does not affect the safety
records of commuters landing at these airports. Instead, the
table demonstrates that large commuters operate with equal
safety into both types of airports.87 Likewise, small commut-
ers have similar safety records whether or not they are operat-
ing into airports equipped with glide slopes.88 Therefore, the
contention that the lack of sophisticated landing aids in
smaller airports leads to poorer safety records for the carriers
serving those airports is not supported. The important impli-
cation of this finding is that service to small community air-
ports is not inherently less safe than service to larger, better
equipped airports. Instead, the characteristics of the com-
muter airline serving the community is a far more important
determinant of the level of safety.
III. FUTURE TRENDS
Commuter safety regulations underwent a major revision
by the FAA in 1978. The revisions evolved from a review of
Table 2




Airports With Glide Slopes
Overall Rate .89 3.72
Average Rate .98 5.50
Airports Without Glide Slopes
Overall Rate .66 4.24
Average Rate .66 5.38
Source: Civil Aeronautics Board, Form 298, Schedule T-1 and National Transpor-
tation Safety Board, Accident Briefs
H Id
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safety regulations that was prompted in part by a 1972 Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report.8 9 The re-
port pointed out several inadequacies in FAA regulation of
commuter airlines, including: 1) inadequate pilot qualifica-
tion requirements, 2) marginal requirements for maintenance
training programs for crew members, and 3) lack of mini-
mum equipment lists and flight continuation rules.90
The FAA's 1978 revisions of Part 135 of its safety regula-
tions addressed these three inadequacies. 91 Part 135 now in-
cludes a provision requiring the pilot in command of a
commuter aircraft seating 10 or more passengers to hold an
airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate rather than simply a
commercial pilot certificate.9 2 This pilot qualification provi-
sion for commuter airlines parallels pilot qualifications for es-
tablished jet carriers under-Part 121 that require an ATP for
all operations. 13
The revised rules have also increased the minimum
amount of pilot experience required for the particular type of
aircraft being used. Specifically, the regulations require a
commuter pilot in command to have made three takeoffs and
three landings in the same type of aircraft within 90 days pre-
ceding a scheduled flight.94 The qualifications for the second-
in-command remain unchanged because they already paral-
lel the requirements for jet carriers operating under Part
121.9" The co-pilot is required to have at least a commercial
pilot certificate with appropriate category and class ratings.96
Revised maintenance requirements for commuter airlines
include more detailed and extensive procedures for all types
and classes of aircraft used by Part 135 operators. The revi-
sions of Part 135 also require additional maintenance record
" Air Taxi Safety Study (National Transportation Safety Board 1972).
Id at 2.
14 C.F.R. § 135 (1978).
12 14 C.F.R. § 135.243 (1983).
14 C.F.R. § 121.437 (1983).
14 C.F.R. § 135.243 (1983).
14 C.F.R. §§ 121.437, 135.245 (1983).
-Id
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keeping. 97 For example, mechanical reliability reports and
mechanical interruption reports were added to the list of re-
quired records. 98 In addition, a requirement that all manuals
list information about "persons with whom a carrier has ar-
ranged to perform its required inspections" was added.99
Initial and recurrent training programs became a basic re-
quirement for all Part 135 operators in 1978. The new rule
requires that the program be approved by the FAA 0 and
that a written curriculum be developed for each type of air-
craft used by a commuter.'' The training programs were ex-
tended to cover pilots, flight attendants, and flight
instructors. 0 2 Crew training is also required in the carriage
of hazardous materials.10 3 The previous rule merely required
a pilot training program appropriate to the type of aircraft
used by the carrier.' 4
Minimum equipment lists for commuters were also estab-
lished for the first time in the 1978 FAA revisions. 10 5 Cockpit
voice recorders, 10 6 ground proximity warning systems, 1 7 fire
extinguishers,' 8 and oxygen equipment'0 9 are some of the
items addressed in the new rule. The FAA has also mandated
radio and navigation equipment for extended over-water
flights and instrument flight rule (IFR) operations. "0 For ex-
ample, whereas before revision commuter air carriers were re-
quired to carry only one transmitter with the ability to
transmit and receive from at least one ground facility at all
times,"' the revised rule requires two such transmitters.'' 2
97 14 C.F.R. § § 135.415, 135.417, 135.419, 135.421 (1983).
- 14 C.F.R. § § 135.415, 135.417 (1983).
14 C.F.R. § 135.419 (1983).
- 14 C.F.R. § 135.323(a)(1) (1983).
- 14 C.F.R. § 135.327 (1983).
,,2 14 C.F.R. § 135.323 (1983).
, 14 C.F.R. § 135.333 (1983).
,04 14 C.F.R. § 135.138 (1977).
14 C.F.R. § 135.149 (1983).
14 C.F.R. § § 135.151, 135.153, 135.155, 135.157 (1983).
,' Id § 135.153.
o, Id § 135.155.
Io d. § 135.157.
14 C.F.R. § 135.165 (1983).
.. Id. § 135.159 (1977).
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The FAA has not applied the upgraded standards of the
1978 revisions equally to all types of operations. Instead, the
new standards take into account the varied nature of com-
muter airlines. Operators flying aircraft with nine or fewer
passenger seats have been placed under an upgraded safety
program that is more stringent than the prior rule but still
very similar to the original Part 135.113 Those commuters
flying aircraft carrying 10 to 30 passengers have been placed
under new Part 135 requirements that approximate the jet
carriers' Part 121,14 and aircraft carrying more than 30 pas-
sengers have been placed under Part 121.1"5
These distinctions place the majority of commuter airline
operators under the new Part 135 since only a relatively small
portion of the commuter industry flies aircraft seating more
than 30 passengers. 1 6 While most operators are governed by
the least stringent portions of Part 135,17 most commuter
revenue passenger-miles (RPM), 67 percent, are flown by
commuter airlines operating either under Part 121 or under
the portions of Part 135 designed to be comparable to Part
121."18 Only the remaining one third of RPM's flown by
commuters remain under rules similar to the original Part
135.
Thus, the 1978 rule change did not uniformly tighten the
safety regulations under which commuter airlines operate.
This variation is unfortunate in light of the differences in
safety performance reported above. The new rules are most
stringent for those segments of the industry that operated
most safely prior to 1978, the larger carriers, yet were tight-
ened least for those segments that amassed the worst safety
record prior to 1978, the smaller carriers.
It is too soon to attempt an assessment of the long-run im-
12 Id § 135.165 (1093).
,, 43 Fed. Reg. 46742, 46743, and see, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 135.169, 135.171, 135.173
(1983).
". 14 C.F.R. § § 121, 135 (1983).
14 C.F.R. § 121 (1983).
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pact of the 1978 revisions on commuter safety. Some insight
into the likely effect can be gained, however, by examining
the experience of the Allegheny Commuter System. The Al-
legheny Commuter System has been a special subset of the
commuter industry since its beginning in 1967. Allegheny
Commuters must meet operation and maintenance standards
set by Allegheny Airlines. These standards historically have
been more stringent than those required by the FAA for other
commuters. Allegheny Commuters has amassed a much safer
record than the rest of the commuter industry with a rate of
0.14 passenger fatalities per million enplanements for Alle-
gheny Commuters versus 3.86 for other commuters. 1 9 Alle-
gheny Commuters has a better safety record than either the
twenty largest non-Allegheny commuters or the established
jet carriers. 120
It would seem that the more stringent standards imposed
by Allegheny Airlines, coupled with the generally high quali-
ty of management in commuters selected by Allegheny Air-
lines, have had a major impact on safety. The excellent
safety record of these carriers provides support for the argu-
ment that revisions in commuter safety regulations which
bring maintenance and operational requirements more in
line with those for certificated carriers would improve safety
in the commuter industry. The comparison further suggests
that the 1978 revisions to Part 135 will further improve com-
muter safety.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under deregulation, the increased reliance on commuter
airlines as replacement carriers for service to small communi-
ties is not inconsistent with the governmental goal of prevent-
ing deterioration in air safety. As the safety record of the
twenty largest commuter airlines indicates, most commuter
airline passengers travel with a level of safety virtually identi-
cal to that which they would experience on established jet
,,, Id, ch. 5.
120 Id
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carriers. Moreover, a major segment of the commuter airline
industry, the Allegheny Commuters, has operated with a
safety record that is superior to that of the jet carriers.
The record of Allegheny Commuters bodes well for com-
muter safety in the future. Its experience while operating
under the tighter standards imposed by Allegheny Airlines
suggests that the tightening of the safety regulations in 1978
might eventually lead to an improvement in commuter air-
line safety. Introduction of the next generation of commuter
aircraft, most of which are anticipated to be turbine-pow-
ered, should also contribute to improved commuter safety be-
cause, as discussed above, small carriers have been able to
operate turbine aircraft much more safely than piston air-
craft. In addition, the recent trends in commuter growth sug-
gest that future growth will likely be concentrated among the
larger and safer carriers. 121
2 C. Oster and K. Zorn, supra note 69, ch. 4, 9.
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